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WATER LAW
by
John L. House*

his Article will address the more important developments in the
Texas law of waters during the past year.' Because of the limited
activity of the second called session of the 68th Legislature, the only
significant developments in Texas water law during the survey period occurred in the judicial and administrative areas. Apart from a few issues, this
Article will not discuss federal regulation of water resources, environmental
law, or public utilities regulation.
I.

A.

CASE LAW

Municipal Regulation of Water Rates

Two cases during the survey period dealt with the authority of a municipality to regulate retail water rates. In each case a municipality tested the
extent of its authority against the more general authority of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) under the Public Utilities Regulatory Act
(PURA).2 In Village of Lakeway v. Lakeway Municipal Utility District No.
13 the Austin court of appeals reviewed the district court's summary judgment declaring void and unenforceable certain ordinances passed by the Village of Lakeway's Board of Commissioners. The ordinances prohibited any
seller of potable water from charging village customers rates in excess of a
certain prescribed ceiling. The ordinances also prohibited the disconnection
of services to customers within the village for failure to pay excess rates and
made the violation of any of the ordinances a misdemeanor.
The village claimed the authority to set water rates on three grounds.
First, the village claimed such authority as part of the statutory authority of
general law cities to provide water to residents and to create, regulate, and
establish public wells, pumps and cisterns, hydrants, and reservoirs. 4 Second, the village claimed authority through the legislative grant of power to
* B.A., Texas Tech University; M.A., University of Southern California; J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
1. Texas water law historically has focused on public and private rights to water from
still bodies and moving courses, both surface and subsurface. The chief concerns have been the
appropriation, detention, collection, diversion, and other uses of water for such purposes as
navigation, irrigation, consumption, recreation, flood control, and electricity generation. The
protection of water bodies and sources from pollution and the purification or rehabilitation of
polluted waters have also been significant concerns of the state and federal governments.
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446 (Vernon 1963).
3. 657 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refed n.r.e.).
4. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1015, § 30 (Vernon 1963).
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city alderman to control the streets, alleys, and other public places within
the corporate limits. 5 Third, the village invoked the regulatory power
granted to municipalities over public utility rates within their jurisdiction as
set out in sections 17(a) and 22 of the PURA. 6 In affirming the summary
judgment of the district court, the court of appeals ruled that neither the
statute providing that general law cities may create and regulate their own
water system 7 nor the statute empowering aldermen with exclusive control
over public places8 grants a general law city authority to set retail water
rates to be charged by a utility district for services rendered within the city's
jurisdiction. 9 The court also rejected the village's claims of authority based
on sections 17(a) and 22 of PURA, holding that political subdivisions are
exempt from a municipality's utility regulation powers under the Act.' 0
The argument for municipal authority to regulate retail water rates based
on section 17(a) of PURA was also successfully invoked in City of Hardin v.
Hardin Water Supply Corp. I" In City of Hardin the Beaumont court of appeals reviewed an ordinance passed by the City of Hardin that was analogous to the ordinances in Village of Lakeway. Hardin likewise asserted
jurisdiction to regulate water rates within its boundaries based upon section
17(a) of PURA. The court of appeals, however, concluded that the legislature had intended that municipalities rather than the PUC regulate the rates
of water supply corporations within their municipal boundaries.' 2 The
Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that a municipality has no inherent authority to set water rates' 3 and that water supply corporations are
excluded from the regulatory authority over public utilities granted to mu14
nicipalities in PURA.
The Village of Lakeway and City of Hardin decisions delineate more
clearly the boundary between municipal and PUC authority in the regulation of retail water rates under PURA. Water districts and water supply
corporations should now be able to set retail rates confidently, without fear
of being subject to the dual jurisdiction of the PUC and the local governments of municipalities to which they provide services.
5. Id. art. 1146, § 2.
6. Id. art. 1446, §§ 17(a), 22 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
7. Id. art. 1015, § 30 (Vernon 1963).
8. Id. art. 1146, § 2.
9. 657 S.W.2d at 914-15.
10. Id. at 915. In so holding, the court approved the district court's finding that the
utility district was a "political subdivision" as defined in PURA. Id.
11. 666 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1984).
12. 666 S.W.2d at 355. The court's error can be traced to confusion over the meaning of
§ 3(c)(4) of PURA, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 3(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
The court mistakenly read this section as reinserting a water supply corporation within the
municipality's purview. 666 S.W.2d at 354. The court's error was prompted by its apparent
acceptance of the notion advanced by both counsel that prior to PURA the city would have
had the requisite authority to set water rates inside its boundaries. See id.
13. Hardin Water Supply Corp. v. City of Hardin, 671 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. 1984).
14. Id.
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B.

Municipal Regulation of Waste Discharges

While municipal jurisdiction to set water rates was restricted by Village of
Lakeway and City of Hardin, the authority of a municipality to regulate certain types of discharge into a watershed within its extraterritorial jurisdiction was reaffirmed in City of Austin v. Jamail.15 An Austin ordinance
required builders to obtain a site development permit prior to clearing land
or commencing construction on a proposed site. The ordinance, conceived
as a measure to control urban runoff, specified the permissible amount of
preconstruction clearing, controlled the amount and slope of impervious surfaces, limited the depth of fill material, and set standards for building foundation and requirements for erosion control. The city sought to enforce the
ordinance with respect to a construction project on land within the Lake
Austin watershed but outside the Austin city limits. As a basis for its authority the city relied on section 26.177(b)(5) of the Texas Water Code,
which imposes a regulatory duty upon cities to control nonspecific waste
6
discharges, including that resulting from urban runoff from rainwater.'
Section 26.177(b)(5) also permits a city to assert its authority within its extraterritorial jurisdiction.17 Austin's five-mile statutory extraterritorial jurisdiction 18 encompassed the land in question. The district court held that the
City of Austin lacked authority to enforce the ordinance outside its city
limits.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Austin court of appeals
distinguished City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Defense Fund,19
upon which the builder relied for the proposition that section 26.177 conferred no regulatory authority whatsoever upon municipalities. 20 The court
distinguished West Lake Hills on two grounds. First, the provisions of section 26.177 relied upon by West Lake Hills for its claim of authority to regulate the use of private sewage facilities within its extraterritorial jurisdiction
are in direct conflict with other Water Code provisions vesting power to
license such facilities in the Texas Water Commission. 2' Section
26.177(b)(5), on the other hand, does not conflict with the Commission's
power. Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that the language in
West Lake Hills that purported to define the scope of subsection (b)(5),
which was not at issue in that case, was mere dicta. 22 Second, subsection
23
(b)(5) calls for municipalities to execute the functions prescribed therein.
15. 662 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
16. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.177(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
17. Id.
18. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 3(A)(5) (Vernon 1963).
19. 598 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
20. The West Lake Hills opinion expressed the view that § 26.177 conferred "information
gathering functions only." Id. at 686.
21. 662 S.W.2d at 781. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.031, .032 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
confer the authority to license private sewage treatment facilities upon the Texas Water Commission and permit the Commission to delegate this authority to cities and county
commissioners.
22. 662 S.W.2d at 781.
23. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.177(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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The court of appeals, therefore, reasoned that by the use of the term "execute" in subsection (b)(5), the legislature must have intended to confer enforcement powers on cities24to control waste discharges within the city's
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
C. Administrative Authority to Compel the Provision of Water Services
The authority of state administrative agencies to compel water suppliers
to provide services was tested in two cases during the survey period. In
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Texas Department of Water Resources25 a developer sought an order from the Texas Water Commission to require Tarrant County Municipal District No. 1 to provide water and sewer services on
a seventy/thirty basis, with the utility district bearing seventy percent of the
cost and the developer thirty percent. Under previous directors, the utility
district had provided services to the developer on that percentage basis. The
current board initially revised the ratio to fifty/fifty and ultimately increased
it to 100% for the developer. The developer challenged the legality of the
cost-basis amendments, alleging that the board's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and intentionally injurious. The Water Commission decided that it
lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by the developer but made
findings of fact and conclusions of law that were adverse to the developer's
position. 26 The developer appealed unsuccessfully to the district court, challenging both the authority of the Commission to make such findings and
conclusions and the substance of the particular findings and conclusions
reached by the court. The court of appeals affirmed the take-nothing judgment of the district court. 27 The appellate court approved the Commission's
assessment that the Commission lacked the authority to grant the relief originally sought by the developer and held that the Commission did have power
under section 12.081 of the Water Code2 8 to make the complained-of find29
ings and conclusions.
The Lake Country Estates decision clarifies the Water Commission's section 12.081 powers that were examined in an earlier dispute between the
same parties, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Toman. 30 Reading the two cases
together makes clear that not only are such findings of fact and conclusions
of law within the Commission's power, but also complaints regarding the
actions of a utility district system are within the Commission's primary juris24. 662 S.W.2d at 782-83.
25. 659 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ).
26. The Water Commission found as fact that the board's actions were not arbitrary,

capricious, unreasonable, or discriminatory and that the district had made no representations
to the developer as to the services it would provide. The Commission concluded as matters of
law that the developer's due process and equal protection rights had not been violated and that
for the Commission to substitute its own judgment for the business judgment of the board
would be improper.
27. 659 S.W.2d at 482.
28. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 12.081 (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides that all constitutional water districts are under the continuing right of supervision of the Texas Department of
Water Resources, of which the Water Commission is a judicial branch.
29. 659 S.W.2d at 482.
30. 624 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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diction. 3' Although Lake Country Estates reaffirmed the conclusion in the
Toman case that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief, 32 the case illustrates that all such complainants must first bring their
cases before the Commission.
The court in Lake Country Estates also held that the Water Commission
could neither compel a utility district to provide service nor set rates for a
utility district. 33 This decision may be contrasted with an earlier decision in
Texas Water Commission v. City of Dallas,34 which held that the Commission has the authority to compel a municipal water supplier, absent a contract, to provide services outside its corporate limits and to fix reasonable
rates for the services rendered. 35 During the survey period, City of Dallas v.
Texas Water Rights Commission36 involved an appeal of the district court's
decision upon remand from the original City of Dallas case.
The importance of the second City of Dallascase is not so much the establishment or reaffirmance of the Commission's authority, but the discretion
that the Commission will have in rehearing a case on remand. In the second
City of Dallas case the city complained of the trial court's direction to the
Commission to consider all points on appeal. The city argued that the trial
court had an obligation to give guidance to the Commission by limiting the
issues to be decided on remand. The Austin court of appeals determined not
only that the district court was not required to limit the scope of the remand,
but that the appellate court should not make legal conclusions pertaining to
the proceeding and should review only the correctness of the action taken by
the lower court. 37 The court of appeals reasoned that it would be inefficient
38
for it to resolve the complicated legal questions that the city had raised.
The court of appeals emphasized that the court could merely give instructions to the Commission and that the Commission might arrive at conclusions different from those it had reached the first time even without
instructions from the court of appeals. 39 Moreover, the court of appeals
pointed out that the Commission's second order could be reviewed again and
that the time and resources it expended in deciding those issues could prove
to have been wasted. 0 The appellate court thus decided simply to affirm the
judgment of the trial court and return the proceeding to the Commission.41
The court further held that rate-making determinations by the Commission
are final and subject to appeal. 42 Consequently, the district court was not
31. Id. at 680-81.
32. In Toman the court found that the department lacked power to grant monetary damages. Id. at 681. Lake Country Estates held that the department lacked authority to grant

specific
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

performance. 659 S.W.2d at 481.
659 S.W.2d at 480, 482.
591 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 611.
674 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
Id. at 903-04.
Id. at 904.
Id.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 905.
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obliged to dismiss the appeal but could reverse the Commission's order
and
43
remand to the Commission for redetermination of the water rates.
D.

The Meaning of "Unappropriated Water" as Pertinent to the Permit
Process

During the survey period the Supreme Court of Texas decided an important case that established procedural limits upon the Texas Department of
Water Resources' permit authority. In Lower Colorado River Authority v.
Texas Department of Water Resources44 the river authority contested a permit issued by the Texas Water Commission to the Lower Colorado Municipal Water District allowing the impoundment of 113,000 acre feet of water
from the Colorado River. The Water Code allows the Commission to grant
a permit to an applicant for the appropriation of state water only if, among
other requirements, "unappropriated water is available in the source of supply."'4 5 The court of appeals had ruled that, although existing appropriation
permits completely exhausted the recorded water level, the Commission
could find that unappropriated water was in the river because historical usage statistics indicated that permit levels had not been, and would not likely
be, fully used. 46 In support of the Commission's authority, the water district
invoked language in section 11.025 of the Water Code, 47 which indicates
that water not being put to beneficial use is to be considered "not appropriated." '48 Consequently, the water district reasoned, unused flow from the
Colorado River is unappropriated water available for other uses for which a
permit may be granted.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that, for the
purpose of Commission action upon a permit application, "unappropriated
water" means the amount of water in excess of the recorded levels of all
existing uncancelled permits and filings. 49 The supreme court cited section
11.146(e) of the Water Code, 50 which provides that when a permit has been
issued for the use of water, new appropriation may not be authorized until
the permit has been wholly or partially cancelled. 5 1 The supreme court held
that the legislature intended
section 11.146(e) to bear upon the definition of
"unappropriated water."' 52 The supreme court, therefore, ruled that the
Commission had no authority to grant a permit to appropriate water when
such water
would invariably affect an existing downstream permittee's
53
rights.
43. Id.
44. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 87 (Nov. 17, 1984), judgmt withdrawn, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 187
(Jan. 12, 1985) (holding that remand, rather than reversal, was required).
45. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
46. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 87.
47. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.025 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
48. Id.
49. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 88.
50. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.146(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
51. Id.
52. 28 Tex, Sup. Ct. J.at 90.

53. Id. at 93.
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The court recognized that the water district and the Commission had another course of action: the full or partial cancellation of previous permits for
failure to put the water to beneficial use. 54 Lower Colorado River Authority,
therefore, in essence provides a measure of due process protection for existing permittees. Existing permittees' rights may still be abrogated by the
Commission in favor of new permittees, but only upon the criteria and pursuant to procedures established in subchapter E. 55 The decision thus avoids
considerable uncertainty with respect to entitlements that would have resulted from the court of appeals decision without imposing substantial limitations on the Commission's authority to issue water use permits.
E. Entitlements to Water by Virtue of Spanish or Mexican Grants
The two most significant cases decided during the survey period examined
claims to water based upon title to land traced to grants from previous sovereigns. Pursuant to a provision of the Texas Constitution of 1836 and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico, title to
lands granted in Texas prior to the adoption of the common law of England
on January 20, 1840, is controlled by the law of the granting sovereign at the
time the grants were made. 56 Such law has been incorporated into the decisional law of Texas. 57 Since Motl v. Boyd5" Texas courts have grappled with
the formidable challenge in terms of legal and historical scholarship
presented by the problem of ascertaining water rights under public and private grants as determined by the laws of Mexico, New Spain, and Spain.
The two survey cases, In Re the Adjudication of the Water Rights in the
60
Medina River Watershed59 and In Re the Contests of the City of Laredo,
represent the most recent attempts to apply the conclusions and scholarly
approach of the San Antonio court of appeals in the leading case State v.
Valmont Plantations6i to particular problems in the area of water rights.
The controversy in Medina River Watershed concerned the rights of a
landowner to appropriate water from a nonperennial stream crossing his
land. The landowner filed a claim with the Texas Water Commission, as
54. Id. Title 2, subchapter E of the Water Code authorizes full and partial cancellation
and determines the requisites and procedures for such actions. TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 11.171-.186 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
55. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.171-.186 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
56. B. DOBKiNs, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 27, 131 (1959); see

Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 253-54, 49 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (1932).
57. State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961),
afl'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962).
58. 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458 (1932). Although the Mot court made a valiant attempt at
determining title to water by virtue of grants by the governments of Mexico and the State of
Coahuila y Texas, many of the conclusions it reached must be viewed as decidedly incorrect in
light of subsequent research. State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1961), affid, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962); see B. DOBKINS, supra
note 56, at 141-43; White & Wilson, The Flow and Underflow of Motl v. Boyd: The Problem, 9
Sw. L.J. 1, 9, 26 (1955).
59. 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1984).
60. 675 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 346 SW.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), affid, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d
502 (1962).
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required by section 11.303 of the Water Rights Adjudication Act.62 The
landowner sought to impound 300 acre feet of water in a reservoir built on
Medio Creek and to divert 518 acre feet for purposes of irrigation. Under
the Water Rights Adjudication Act, all claims to water rights not evidenced
by permits granted by the Commission or by filing under the 1913 Irrigation
Act 63 are limited to the maximum amount of water beneficially used in any
one year between 1963 and 1967. 64 Applying that limitation, the Commission ruled that the landowner could divert only 89.15 acre feet and was foreclosed from impounding any water. 65 The landowner challenged the
Commission's decision in district court, claiming all water by virtue of title
derived from the original 1833 land grant from the Mexican State of Coahuila y Texas to the landowner's earliest predecessor in title. The crucial
question was whether the 1833 grant included rights to appropriate the
water from the creek for irrigation and other related purposes. The state
argued that the grant was silent and that under the rule of Valmont Plantations Mexican grants did not carry implied grants of riparian rights to water
for irrigation. 6 6 The landowner argued that the Valmont Plantationsdecision applied to perennial streams, which were public, not nonperennial
streams, which by their nature were private under Spanish law. The district
court found for the landowner, and the court of appeals affirmed. 67 The
68
appellate court's ruling also relied upon the holding of McCurdy v. Morgan
to the effect that the69bed of a nonperennial stream was the property of the
adjacent landowner.
The supreme court found no Mexican law to settle the point. Following
the approach used in the Valmont Plantationsopinion, the supreme court
retreated to the historical precedents of Mexican law, the law of New Spain
and peninsular Spain. The court determined that although a distinction between public and private streams had existed in peninsular Spain, that distinction had not been carried over into New Spain. 70 Moreover, the supreme
court reemphasized the Valmont Plantationsprinciple that in New Spain the
king held title to all land and water except when the king himself or his duly
appointed viceroys or other functionaries had expressly conveyed rights to
others.7 1 Since the 1833 grant was silent as to water rights to the stream,
and since no irrigation rights to a public stream could be implied, the
supreme court concluded that the 1833 grant conveyed no title to the waters
of the stream. 72 The Texas Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the judg§ 11.303 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
63. Irrigation Act of 1913, ch. 177, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 358; see TEX. WATER CODE
62. TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

ANN. § 11.303(a)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
64. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.303 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
65. 670 S.W.2d at 251.
66. See 346 S.W.2d at 874.

67. 645 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1982) rev'd, 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1984).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

265 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd).
645 S.W.2d at 605.
670 S.W.2d at 253-54.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
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ments of the district and appellate courts. 73
The central question addressed in City of Laredo was whether the successor cities of Spanish pueblos were granted special priority appropriative
rights over private and subsequent municipal claimants under what has been
termed the "pueblo water rights doctrine." 74 Although this issue had been
addressed previously by the courts of California and New Mexico, it was one
of first impression for Texas courts. Under California law, each pueblo established under the laws of New Spain or Mexico possesses a paramount
right to appropriate and distribute waters to administer to the needs of the
pueblo inhabitants. 75 The pueblo water right supercedes the rights of private
individuals and pueblos established by subsequent grants. 76 Furthermore, as
the needs of the city expands, so do the rights and powers necessary to administer to the needs of the inhabitants, 77 though the paramount rights of
expanded or successor cities are limited to the water needs of the inhabitants
of the area in which the old pueblo was located. 78 Moreover, the pueblo
water rights encompass not only the stream to which the old pueblo was
riparian but also all tributaries. 79 In addition to California, New Mexico
80
also has adopted the pueblo water rights doctrine.
The City of Laredo contended that it was the successor to a pueblo established by the Spanish crown in 1767. The city argued that the grant that the
pueblo received entitled the city to appropriate all the water from the Middle
Rio Grande Basin, including all contributing Texas tributaries. Both the
Texas Water Commission and the district court denied the city's claim. 1
The Austin court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, refusing
generally to recognize the validity of the pueblo water rights doctrine in
Texas and holding particularly that the City of Laredo possessed no such
rights.8 2 The court of appeals based its decision on the fact that the act of
the General Visita of 1767 that granted all land and water rights to the City
of Laredo did not expressly grant powers analogous to pueblo water rights to
the pueblo of Laredo.8 3 Moreover, the court of appeals, having examined
the most significant texts of Spanish and New Spanish law, Las Siete Partidas and the Recopilacidn de Leyes de los Reynos de Las Indias,respectively,
and the works of a few commentators, could find no basis for the principle
that Spanish pueblos possessed paramount water rights.8 4 The court of appeals noted that the Spanish commentator relied on by the city, Joaquin
73. Id. at 255.
74. 675 S.W.2d at 259.
75. Id.
76. Id.; City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899).
77. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943); City of

Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 601, 57 P. 585, 600 (1899).
78. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943); City of
Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 601, 57 P. 585, 600 (1899).
79. 675 S.W.2d at 268.
80. See Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1963).
81. 675 S.W.2d at 258.

82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 266.

84. Id.
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Eschriche, was discredited in Valmont Plantationsfor improperly including
elements from the Napoleonic Code in treatises on Spanish and Mexican
law.8 5 Finally, the opinion underscored the criticism of one noted commentator 6 that the California pueblo water rights doctrine arose from a presumption created in Lux v. Haggin,8 7 an early California water rights case. 8
The Medina River Watershed and City of Laredo decisions have continued
the admirable trend that began with Valmont Plantations in approaching
questions of Mexican and Spanish law in a thorough and scholarly manner.8 9 These decisions have clarified particular points of law and expanded
the body of knowledge on which courts may rely in settling future disputes.
Yet there are problems with both decisions, particularly the City of Laredo
opinion. Valmont Plantationsbroke ground not only for its admirable methodology, but also for breaking through the veneer of Anglo-American legal
principles that had been superimposed upon Spanish and Mexican law in
such decisions as Mod v. Boyd. 90 Valmont Plantationsshowed convincingly
that the water rights system of the previous sovereigns was not riparian in
nature. 91 Nevertheless, Medina River Watershed and City of Laredo overlooked this insight and reintroduced riparian concepts into the analysis. As
a result, the nature and extent of private water rights in New Spain and
Mexico, and the manner in which private rights differed from public water
rights, remains unclear. Moreover, the City of Laredo court may have erred
in denying categorically the existence of pueblo water rights: at least one
commentator believes that pueblo rights had been firmly established in Spain
for centuries and were present in New Spain as well.92
85. Id. at 267 (citing State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 867-69 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1961), affid, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962)).
86. Hutchins, Pueblo Water Rights in the West, 38 TEX. L. REV. 748, 758 (1960).
87. 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884).
88. 675 S.W.2d at 267-69.
89. The City of Laredo decision improved upon the methodology of Valmont Plantations
by demonstrating that when peninsular Spanish law is unclear, recourse may be had to Roman
law and particularly to the Institutes of Justinian. See 675 S.W.2d at 259.
90. 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458 (1932).
91. 346 S.W.2d at 859, 863.
92. B. DOBKINS, supra note 56, at 71-72, 90. For centuries most Spanish pueblos, as
fortified centers against the Moors, were given specialized privileges by which they exercised
control over adjoining lands. Id. at 71, 83. This author believes that the City of Laredo court
relied too heavily upon the work of Davenport and Canales, who wrote with a definite bias
towards the common law riparian system. See Davenport & Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters with Special Reference to Irrigationfrom the Lower Rio Grande,8 BAYLOR L. REV.
283, 302 (1956). Furthermore, the dismissal by the Austin court of appeals of the Spanish
commentator Joaquin Escriche because he had imported elements from the Napoleonic Code
was too summary: the pueblo water rights doctrine was not such a borrowing. The court's
dismissal of Escriche is ironic because what Escriche incorrectly mixed into his commentaries
were riparian elements from the Napoleonic Code, elements heavily relied upon by Davenport
and Canales.
Another problem with the City of Laredo opinion is that the parties to the litigation did not
go far enough in their research of Spanish legal materials. The court was presented with only
the central legal texts of peninsular Spain and New Spain, Las Siete Partidasand the Recopilacidn de Leyes de los Reynos de Las Indias, respectively. Finding no mention of pueblo water
rights in these legal texts satisfied the court that they never existed. Yet the rule is that all the
law of the granting sovereign is controlling, not merely the law as reflected in the primary
texts. 675 S.W.2d at 260. Besides the law of the central government in Spain, a strong system
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II.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS

A.

Water Quality Standards

The Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) adopted amendments to
the waste load evaluation standards for the Houston Ship Channel. 93 The
amendments lower the water quality standards for dissolved oxygen in segment 1007 of the ship channel from 1.5mg./1 to 1.0m./J, effectively relaxing
94
the advanced treatment levels necessary to meet the previous standards.
The central rationale for relaxing the standards was cost savings for the parties responsible for complying with the standards. 95 An additional justification was that the amendments allow time for studies to develop less
96
expensive alternatives.
B.

Water Treatment Inspection Fee Program

The TWDB has adopted new rules and regulations establishing a waste
treatment inspection fee program as recently required by the Texas Legislature. 97 The fee will be assessed at graduating rates from $100 for no discharge permits to $2,000 for permits allowing discharges exceeding 2.5
million gallons daily, calculated on a daily average flow. 98 The proceeds
from fee collections will be used to finance the Texas Department of Water
Resources' costs of inspecting waste treatment facilities and miscellaneous
enforcement expenses. 99
C.

Water Loan Assistance

The TWDB adopted an amendment to its rules changing the definition of
"lending rate" as it pertains to financial assistance from the water loan
assistance fund. 1oo The change permits the TWDB to loan funds to political
subdivisions to allow them to meet debt service obligations on bonds issued
to finance water and sewer projects.101 The amended rule also allows loan
of regional or local laws, developed from Moorish, Visigothic, and Roman law. B. DOBKINS,

supra note 56, at 43-57, 63, 70-73. The local water law and customs, rooted in the principle
that water was community property to be used subject to municipal rules and regulations, were
often more familiar and of greater relevance to the community or pueblo than the king's law.
Id. at 82-83.
93. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5450 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 1480 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 333.21 (Surface Water Quality Standards)).
94. 8 Tex. Reg. at 5450.
95. Id.
96. Hall, New Water Load Evaluation for the Houston Ship Channel, 14 STATE B. TEX.
ENVTL. L.J. 9 (1984). This amendment is a change in TWDB policy from the positions taken
with respect to Lake Austin and Lake Travis. In those instances discharges were banned while
studies were carried out, whereas discharges into the ship channel will continue while studies
are being conducted. Id.
97. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.0291 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
98. Tex Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 3670 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 5455 (1983) (codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 341.401-.407).
99. 8 Tex. Reg. at 3672.
100. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 3181 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 282 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.2).

101. 8 Tex. Reg. at 3181-82.
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assistance to political subdivisions on a front-end basis to help finance large
10 2
water or sewage projects.
D.

Water Rights Permits

A number of provisions were amended and new regulations adopted by
the TWDB with respect to the water appropriation permit system. Permits
authorized by section 11.142 of the Water Code 10 3 will be confined to use
from reservoirs constructed on non-navigable streams. 1° 4 Contractual permits for the use of water already authorized for the use of another person are
no longer issued, 10 5 but suppliers of state water must apply for a contractual
amendment based upon their contractual arrangements. 10 6 New regulations
allow irrigation permits to be issued to lessees with consent of the landowner
for a limited time but on a renewable basis.107
Notice and a hearing are required for temporary permits if a complaint
has been made about the use proposed. 10 8 A prior hearing is mandatory for
cancellation of a permit for failure to commence or complete construction.109 New TWDB regulations have also extended the time limit for commencement of construction on direct diversion facilities from ninety days to
two years, and the regulations grant the Texas Water Commission the authority to further extend the time limit. 110 The executive director of the
Texas Department of Water Resources may except the requirements for
written plans, inspection specifications, and construction requirements for
dams and reservoirs if the physical conditions or size of the project makes
the requirements unnecessary."I' A new provision also provides emergency
procedures for dam safety. 112 Finally, other TWDB regulatory amendments
3
have changed the general requirements for permit applications."l
102. Id. at 3182.
103. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.142 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 11.142 deals with

permits allowing impoundment of water for domestic and livestock purposes. Id.
104. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5255 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3461 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.6).
105. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5255 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3461 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.5).
106. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5259 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3462 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.111-.113,.118-.120).
107. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5258 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3463 (1984)
(codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.61-.62).
108. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 3464 (1984) (amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 303.92).
109. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5265 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3467 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 307.32).

110. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 3468 (1984) (codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 307.61-.63).
111. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5269 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3469 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 309.4).

112. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5269 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3470 (1984)
(codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 309.13).
113. Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8 Tex. Reg. 5256 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3463 (1984)
(amending 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.22, .25, .33-.34, .36-.37); Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 8
Tex. Reg. 5263 (1983), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3465, 3466 (1984) (amending 31 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 305.2, .23).

